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were quite popular among ethical theorists in the analytic tradition. 1) However, it seems that ideal observer theories in general have been relatively neglected in the Korean philosophical community. One purpose of this paper is to introduce ideal observer theories to Korean philosophers.
Among the many variants of ideal observer theories, this paper will focus on one of the early prototypes of the theory that was presented by Roderick Firth in 1952 . I hope to introduce other variants of the ideal observer theory in different papers.
In his article "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", 2) Firth presents a very interesting analysis of ethical statements. According to Firth, the meaning of ethical statements of the form "X is right (or good)" can be adequately expressed by statements of the form "Any ideal observer would react to X in such and such a way under such and such conditions."(p.329) Here, we can see that Firth is interpreting moral properties or moral facts to be equivalent to certain types of psychological reactions of an ideal observer. Then, what kind of being is an "ideal observer"? According to Firth, an ideal observer is basically a human being who possesses certain kinds of characteristics to an extreme degree. The major characteristics that Firth attributes to an ideal observer are the following: First of all, an ideal observer, according to Firth, is omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts. 3) That is, an ideal observer possesses a 1) See (Railton 1986a; Railton 1986b; Smith et al. 1989; Firth, 1952; Firth, 1955; Brandt, 1955; Brandt, 1998; Harsanyi 1977) . Among these people, some have used the apparatus of ideal observer theory to analyze individual goodness or value (e.g. Railton 1986a; Railton 1986b; Smith et al.) Others have used the approach to analyze moral goodness and moral rightness(e.g. Firth 1952; Firth 1955; Brandt 1955; Brandt 1998) . And, some used the approach to render interpersonal comparison of well-being possible to justify utilitarianism(e.g. Harsanyi 1977 ; for a good introduction to Harsanyi's utilitarianism, see Weymark 1991) . 2) Firth, Roderick, "Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Mar., 1952) .
complete set of full factual knowledge. Second, an ideal observer is capable of vividly imagining all of the relevant facts as if he or she were directly perceiving them. In this sense, an ideal observer is omnipercipient. 4) Third, an ideal observer is completely disinterested in the sense of lacking all particular interests. 5) Fourth, an ideal observer is completely dispassionate in the sense of lacking all particular emotions. 6) Fifth, an ideal observer is completely consistent in his or her ethical reactions in the sense that he or she will always show the same ethical reactions towards the same situation. 7) And finally, an ideal observer is normal in every other respect that has not been specifically characterized. 8) So, according to the ideal observer theory that Firth proposes, when somebody claims that "X is right" what that person is really claiming is that "an idealized human being, who has perfect knowledge of all non-ethical facts, and who is able to imagine all of those facts vividly as if he or she were directly perceiving them, and who is completely disinterested and completely dispassionate, and who is in every other respect normal, would psychologically react to X in a positive way."
Here, we can see that Firth's ideal observer theory is basically an analysis of ethical statements; it analyzes ethical statements and reveals what they really mean.
3) Ibid. p.333. 4) Ibid., p.335. 5) Ibid., p.335. 6) Ibid., p.340. 7) Note that although Firth contends that the ideal observer is consistent in his or her moral reactions, Firth thinks that consistency has a rather different status than all of the other characteristics; that is, according to Firth, consistency is not really an independent characteristic of the ideal observer, but rather a consequence of all of the other characteristics (such as omniscience, omnipercipience, disinterestedness, dispassionateness, etc.) functioning properly. In this sense, consistency can be seen as redundant in defining the ideal observer. See Ibid., pp.341-344. 8) Ibid., p.344. According to Firth, analyzing ethical statements in this way has a number of characteristics. First of all, according to Firth, the proposed analysis deems the truth of ethical statements to be absolute rather than relative. 9) This is because, according to Firth, any subjectivist analysis of ethical statements. Therefore, I think that a better way to characterize a subjectivist analysis and an objectivist analysis of ethical statements would be (not whether all ethical statements would turn out to be necessarily false if there happens to be no experiencing human subject, but) whether the actual existence of experiencing human subjects have any logical bearing to the truth or falsity of ethical statements. I thank Nick Sturgeon for providing me with this insight. 13) Ibid., p.324. 14) Just as a statement about secondary qualities, say "daffodil is yellow", is usually analyzed as expressing the same meaning as the sentence, "the daffodil will appear in a certain way to a certain kind of observer under certain conditions", Firth's ideal observer theory construes ethical statements such as "X is right" as expressing the same meaning as the statement "an ideal observer would be disposed to psychologically react to X is a positive way." (See Ibid., p.324) 15) Ibid., p.325.
It is quite easy to see why such an ideal observer theory could be appealing to many people.
First of all, it is less ontologically committed than certain views in ethics that posit moral properties, which are usually seen as properties that are intrinsically different from natural properties, existing independently as furniture of the world. 16) According to the ideal observer theory, moral properties are nothing more than certain types of psychological reactions of idealized human beings; or to put it in another way, the psychological reactions of idealized human being make moral properties. In this way, the ideal observer theory successfully avoids the complicated metaphysical issues that arise from the existence of moral properties.
Second, even though the ideal observer theory construes moral properties to be nothing more than certain types of psychological reactions, it, nonetheless, preserves the prima facie objectivity of the truth of ethical statements. This is because the ideal observer theory doesn't deem the psychological reactions of just any kind of being to be relevant in determining the truth of ethical statements; the psychological reactions that are relevant are only those of idealized human beings and the fact that these human beings are idealized implies that their psychological reactions to a given situation are somewhat correct and authoritative. In this sense, the ideal observer theory seems to be combining the major attractions of both cognitive and non-cognitive views in ethics. 17) 16) Note that this advantage of the ideal observer theory doesn't apply to ethical naturalism which regards moral properties to be natural properties. 17) That is, the ideal observer theory acknowledges that there are moral facts and moral properties that make ethical statements objectively true or false. So, it accommodates one of the main attractions of cognitive moral theories. However, the ideal observer theory construes the moral facts and moral properties that determine the truth-value of ethical statements to be certain types of subjective psychological
One last attraction of the ideal observer theory comes from its science-friendliness. As I have briefly noted, the ideal observer theory construes the meaning of ethical statements to be expressing the psychological reactions that an idealized human being would feel towards a given situation. Here, the psychological reactions of an ideal observer are the properties that can be, in principle, studied by the various sciences, such as psychology, biology, neurophysiology, and so on. Of course, the ideal observer theory itself is, as we have seen, intended to be an analysis of ethical statements. However, once the analysis is accepted, the ideal observer theory makes it possible to investigate first-order moral judgments in an empirical way. This makes the study of normative ethics empirical and puts its theoretical status on par with other scientific disciplines. This is a major attraction of the theory to those who are scientific-minded.
So, the ideal observer theory, when developed successfully, can provide a very powerful tool for doing normative ethics. And Firth's ideal observer theory seems to come very close to such success.
Unfortunately, Firth's ideal observer theory has a number of innate problems that don't seem to be easily overcome within his own framework. The main purpose of this paper is to expose these problems.
Most of these problems stem from the many defining characteristics of the ideal observer as well as the many characteristics of the proposed analysis conflicting with each other. Some other problems stem from
Firth's rather imperfect characterization of such notions as "impartiality"
and "relativist". Now, let's look at those problems in detail.
responses of an ideal observer which are mainly positive or negative attitudes that are essentially non-cognitive in their nature. In this way, it also accommodates one of the main attractions of non-cognitive moral theories as well.
Ⅱ. THE PROBLEMS
As we have seen, the main attractions of the ideal observer theory come from the following three features:
(1) It is less ontologically committed in the sense that, by identifying moral properties with psychological reactions of the ideal observer, it doesn't have to posit independent (non-natural) moral
properties that exist as furniture of the world in order to explain the truth of ethical statements.
(2) Even though it construes moral properties as being psychological reactions of the ideal observer, it still retains our commonsense intuition that ethical statements are somewhat objectively true or false.
(3) It fits well with our scientific picture of the world by making normative ethics essentially an empirical study.
It seems that any version of the theory should try to retain these three characteristics as much as possible. The problem is that this is not an easy task to do. So, a typical relativist analysis of ethical statements would construe ethical statements such as "X is right" as expressing the same meaning as sentences like "I would feel approval towards X" or "Most people here and now would feel approval towards X" and so on. Here, we can see that each of these analyses include egocentric expressions (i.e. "I", According to Firth, whether or not an analysis contains egocentric 18) Examples of egocentric expressions include personal pronouns ("I", "you", etc.), the corresponding possessive adjectives ("my", "your", etc.), words that refer to spatial temporal location ("this", "that", "here", "there", "now", "then", "past", "present", "future", etc.), reflexive expressions such as "the person who is speaking", and the various linguistic devices which are used to indicate the tense of verbs. 19) Firth claims that "an analysis of ethical statements is relativistic if it includes an egocentric expression, and if it is incompatible with any alternative analysis which does not include an egocentric expression" (Ibid. Now, if there really were Martians, then it seems perfectly possible for 20) Firth claims "We may now define an absolutist analysis of ethical statements as one which is not relativist. The kind of analysis which I propose to discuss in this paper, therefore, is one which does not include an egocentric expression." (Firth, ibid. p.319) 21) Of course, this can be properly done only when the analysis is fully developed. This is because an analysis may only implicitly include egocentric expressions in which the egocentric expressions appear only after the analysis is developed in its full-fledged form. We will later see that Firth's own ideal observer theory could be seen as implicitly including egocentric expressions in precisely this sense. 22) Ibid. p.344. The criticism that I will be making afterwards will still apply even if we interpret the set of persons to include highly cognitive primates. observer is normal, then he or she must be normal in a more specified sense; such as being "normal for us living here and now" or being "normal for human beings beginning 5000 years ago" or being "normal for human beings living in modern democratic societies" and so on in order for the analysis to generate any determinate results for the meaning of particular ethical statements. In this way, we can see that although Firth's ideal observer theory might not include egocentric expressions on its surface, it may, nonetheless, implicitly include such egocentric expressions which will appear when the analysis is developed into its full-fledged form. If this is the case, then Firth's ideal observer theory can be accused of being relativistic in precisely the same sense that Firth defines "a relativistic analysis" of ethical statements.
So, the problem for Firth on his characterization of a relativist analysis can be summarized as the following dilemma: either he would need to use ego-centric terms himself in order to fix the notion of normality which would make his ideal observer theory a relativist analysis by his own standards, or he might be able to avoid using any ego-centric terms by fixing the notion of normality to any specific time or location which would then make his analysis totally arbitrary. were completely different; 29) B acquired every other factual belief that he 29) David Velleman, (in his article "Brandt's Definition of "Good"(1988)") has raised a similar objection to Brandt's "Full-information account of the "Good"". According to Brandt (1979) , what is good for a certain agent is what that agent would desire after the agent obtained full factual information through what he calls "cognitive psychotherapy". One of the many objections that Velleman raises against Brandt is that the same agent might desire things differently, even after obtaining full factual information through cognitive psychotherapy, depending on what specific medium that the full factual information was introduced. (See Velleman (1988) ; pp.365-368) Peter Railton, who also proposes a version of a full-information account of value in "Facts and Values (1986)", also considers the problem of the effects that the specific mode and order of factual representation would have on the agent who achieved full factual information. In the example that I have provided, we can see that the order as well as the mode of how A and B attained full factual information was completely different. Railton tries to appease this worry by arguing that the effect of the order of presentation would become very dilute by second-order mechanisms of neutralization (i.e. the neutralization process that takes place when one becomes aware of how different orders of presentation could have effected one's conative systems) as the total volume of information grows (Railtion, 2003, p.58 ) and by had not acquired by his own past experience by experimental conditioning, while this is not the case for A by assumption.
Accordingly, A and B would each associate completely different experiences to each of the respective non-ethical factual beliefs they have, and the impact of these different associated experiences can very well cause them to show quite different psychological reactions towards the same act.
Of course, Firth has a device to counter this kind of result; and the device is his requirement of "omnipercipience". 30) According to Firth, being omniscient respect to non-ethical facts (in the sense of being able to make true factual judgments) is insufficient to make that person an ideal observer; "The ideal observer must be able, on the contrary, simultaneously to visualize all actual facts, and the consequences of all possible acts in any given situation, just as vividly as he would if he were actually perceiving them all." (Firth, 1952, p.335) It might be the case that any two subjects who met the omnipercipience requirement would necessarily associate exactly the same perceptual experiences to any set of non-ethical factual beliefs. So, the impacts of the different causal histories associated to the non-ethical factual beliefs of A and B might as well, in practice, be neutralized by making B meet the omnipercipience requirement. However, it seems that the omnipercipience requirement is still insufficient to nullify all of the lingering effects of B's past experiences past experiences and past false beliefs.
arguing that many different modes of presentation would essentially have the same effect as our conative systems is not infinitely fine-grained (Railtion, 2003, p.60 We cannot simply say that, since the two ideal observers each meet different standards of normality, at least one of them is not really an ideal observer, since, then, we would have to justify why one standard of normality is more legitimate than the other. Unless we are able to provide this justification, dismissing any one of these ideal observers as non-ideal would be totally arbitrary. If Firth tries to avoid this problem by stipulating the meaning of "normal" as "normal for human being living in the present", then Firth's analysis will again contain what he calls an egocentric term, and would, thereby, turn into a relativistic analysis by his own standards. So, we are back to the dilemma that has been mentioned for Firth's characterization of a relativist analysis.
Objectivist Analysis vs. Subjectivist Analysis
As one might have noticed, Firth's ideal observer theory, even without the additional defining characteristics, is already quite impractical. It identifies the meaning of ethical statements with the meaning of 31) This is again related to one of Velleman's objections towards "the full-information account of the good" that the type of dispositions that one happens to currently possess would significantly influence how certain factual information would affect one's desires; according to Velleman, "Images of alien cultures may rouse us to wonderment if we're cosmopolitan, whereas if we're provincial, the same images may arouse contempt; the thought of a storm at sea may thrill us if we're brave but sicken us if we're timid; and our hearts may grow either hard or tender at the sight of other people's pain'("Brandt's Definition of "Good"", p.360) Of course, these specific objections of Velleman would not apply to Firth's ideal observer theory, since not only is Firth requiring full factual information, but also full perceptual vividness, complete disinterestedness and complete dispassionateness which would, in many cases, nullify the effects of people's particular dispositional traits. However, Firth's many characterizations of the ideal observer would still be insufficient to nullify the different psychological reactions of two ideal observers who each had different dispositions of normality based on different conceptions of 'what is normal'. statements about psychological reactions of an ideal observer; but in order for somebody to be an ideal observer he or she must be omniscient and omnipercipient with respect to non-ethical facts, perfectly disinterested and dispassionate, consistent in his or her ethical reactions, normal in all other respects, and now, he or she might also be required to be completely free from the lingering as well as the subconscious effects of his or her past experiences as well as his or her past false beliefs. Even without the last additional requirement, it seems virtually impossible for any living human being to even roughly satisfy all of the defining characteristics of an idea observer that Firth requires. And if it is just plainly impossible for there to be any actual ideal observers in Firth's sense, then, one might wonder; shouldn't this fact influence the meaning of ethical statements in any way?
Firth's response to this question is quite simple. The answer is: not at all. Obviously, Firth doesn't want all ethical statements to turn out truth-valueless simply because there are no ideal observers that actually exist. And this is his main motivation for defining the distinction between an "objectivist analysis" and a "subjectivist analysis" in a very idiosyncratic way.
When Firth characterizes his ideal observer theory as an objectivist analysis of ethical statements, he claims that he is using the terms "subjectivist" and "objectivist" in a traditional ontological sense-"in the sense in which Berkeley's analysis of all physical statements is subjectivist, and Descartes' analysis of some physical statements is objectivist." (Firth 1952, p.322) …a proposed analysis of ethical statements is subjectivist if it construes ethical statements in such a way that they would all be false by definition if there existed no experiencing subjects (past, present, or future). An analysis may be called "objectivist," on the other hand, if it is not subjectivist. (Firth 1952, p.322) Therefore, when Firth claims that his ideal observer theory is objectivist, what he is mainly saying is that, although the ideal observer theory construes the meaning of ethical statements as expressing the same meaning as the statements about psychological reactions of an ideal observer, whether or not an ideal observer actually exists is logically irrelevant to the truth or falsity of ethical statements.
Firth emphasizes that the adjective "ideal" is here used in approximately the same sense in which we speak of a perfect vacuum or a frictionless machine as ideal things (Firth 1952, p.321) . The term implies that the thing in question is conceivable and possesses certain characteristics to an extreme degree; it doesn't imply that the ideal thing in question actually exists in real life. Just as the fact that there are no perfect vacuums or perfectly frictionless machines in real life does not influence the truth or falsity of scientific theories that rely on these idealistic concepts, the fact that there are no ideal observers in real life does not, in any way, influence the truth or falsity of ethical statements.
In this way, ethical statements can be interpreted as contrary-to-fact conditionals in the subjunctive mood; the ethical statement "X is right" means that "if there were an ideal observer, the ideal observer would be disposed to react to X in a positive way." The latter sentence can be true, even if there were no ideal observers in actual circumstances. And it is precisely in this sense that Firth regards his ideal observer theory as objectivist rather than subjectivist.
As we have seen, the main motivation for characterizing the terms "objectivist" and "subjectivist" in this particular way stems from Firth's desire to retain the meaning as well as the truth-value of ethical statements even when there happens to be no ideal observers in the actual world. However, characterizing objectivism and subjectivism in this traditional ontological sense has a number of problems.
First, the characterization is somewhat misleading. As we have seen, one of the main attractions of an ideal observer theory comes from the very fact that it is subjective; that is, it interprets moral properties to be nothing more than the subjective psychological reactions of an idealized human being. The fact that the subjective psychological responses are what makes ethical statements true is a vital part of the ideal observer theory, since not only does this free an ideal observer theorist from being ontologically committed to non-natural moral properties that some philosophers deemed to be metaphysically queer, 32) but it also naturalizes ethics and turns it into an empirical science that can be conducted in accordance with psychological, biological, and neural physiological research.
Moreover, as we have already seen, another part of the attraction of the ideal observer theory comes from the fact that the ideal observer theory retains the objectivity of ethical statements. That is, even though an ideal observer theory interprets moral properties to be nothing more than the subjective psychological responses of a certain being, it, nonetheless, retains the prima facie objectivity of the truth of ethical statements by confining the relevant psychological reactions, which determine the meaning of ethical statements, to those of an idealized subject. Here, the fact the psychological reactions that determine the truth of ethical statements come from, not just any sort of subject, but from an idealized subject makes those psychological reactions not merely subjective, but also objective and, therefore, authoritative as well. Firth's characterization of objectivity and subjectivity seems to make these major attractions of an ideal observer theory far less unclear.
32) See Mackie, John, Ethics-inventing right and wrong, Penguin Books, 1977. 
The Empirical Inaccessibility of the Ideal Observer
However, the problem on whether or not the actual existence of an ideal observer influences the truth or falsity of ethical statements seems less important compared to the problem on whether the fact that it is impossible for an ideal observer to actually exist undermines the theory's empirical accessibility.
Since there are apparently no ideal observers in real life, there is no way for us to have any direct epistemic access to how an ideal observer would react to any given ethical situation. 33) If this is the case, then, how is Firth's ideal observer theory supposed to make normative ethics an empirical theory that is on par with the other sciences?
In this sense, we should note that For example, in a perfect vacuum there would be absolutely no air resistance when a certain object falls. This means that a falling object in perfect vacuum would strictly obey the laws of gravity. Therefore, we would be able to provide a perfect prediction on the exact location as well as the exact velocity of the object at T2 by being provided with the 33) In this way, Railton agrees that his notion of idealized desires (which is comparable to Firth's ideal observer theory) is unabashedly a theoretical one (Railton, 2003, p.57) .
information of the initial location as well as the velocity of the object at
T1.
Let's look at another example in economics. In a perfectly competitive market, there are absolutely no externalities. Therefore, any good would be produced to the extent that the marginal social utility that it brings matches the marginal social cost of its production. In this way, the social equilibrium point will always match the social optimum point. By This is not the case for the ideal observer theory that Firth presents.
Firth's ideal observer theory cannot serve as a scientific model, since,
although we know what conditions must be fulfilled in order for someone to be an ideal observer, we do not know how fulfilling these conditions would influence the ideal observer in any way that would make us reasonably predict how the ideal observer will psychologically react to any given situation. 34) Since we are unable to know or even reasonably 34) Thus, empirical inaccessibility is one of the major problems of such moral theories that rely on such idealized conditions. Velleman raises a similar problem to Brandt's version of "the full-information account of the good" which he calls the empirical indeterminateness of such idealized theories. The objection is that if such idealized theory tries to nullify the effects of different modes of factual representation by requiring the subject to be exposed to facts from all possible angles (where this includes all future modes of representation that has yet been developed), then no scientific or observational method would be able to assess how having full factual information in such way would impact a given subject. (see Velleman, 1988, pp.368-370) Note how this is parallel to my objection that requiring complete predict how an ideal observer would react to any given situation, we are unable to practically use this theory to evaluate whether one person is closer to an ideal judge than another in respect to a certain situation in real life.
The most devastating thing is that, since we are unable to know or even reasonably predict how an ideal observer would react to any given situation, we are unable to use Firth's ideal observer theory to figure out what the truth-value for any particular ethical statement would actually be. This means that the theory is practically useless.
Moreover, it also means that Firth's ideal observer theory practically turns out to be a version of ethical agnosticism; it contends that there are ethical statements that are objectively true, but we cannot know which ones they are. This is disappointing since we would want our first order moral theory to not merely claim that the truth of ethical statements are objective and absolute, but also to provide us with a practically feasible guidance to figure out which particular ethical statements are really true in this objective and absolute way. This is especially so for a moral theory that purports to be empirical and deems this as one of its major advantages to other non-empirical moral theories. 35) factual knowledge of the distant future would undermine the ideal observer theory's empirical accessibility by rendering reasonable prediction of the ideal observer's psychological reactions virtually impossible. 35) We should note that even Railton, who is an advocate of such idealized theories of morality, acknowledges the problem of empirical inaccessibility of such theories. For example, Railton claims; "We are not ourselves fully informed, and thus do not know the answer to the question where an extrapolation of our desires would lead." However, "Given nothing more powerful than commonsense psychological theory, we may feel reasonably confident that there is an answer." (Railton, 2003, p. 58) The question that I am raising here is that merely knowing that an answer exists to specific moral questions is not enough for such moral theories to work; in order for the ideal observer theory to have any practical use, (as any viable empirical theory should), we must, at the least, be able to reasonably predict what the theory would regard as answers to specific moral questions. The ideal observer theory loses its Ⅲ. SUMMARY Until now, we have seen some of the major problems that I raised against Firth's ideal observer theory. Here is a summary of the problems that I have raised so far.
There are three main attractions of an ideal observer theory in ethics:
(a) it is less ontologically committed by insisting that moral properties are nothing more than the subjective psychological reactions of an idealized human subject, (b) it, nonetheless, preserves our common sense intuition that the truth of ethical statements are prima facie absolute, and (c) it naturalizes ethics by making it an empirical theory that can be pursued in accordance with other scientific disciplines.
It seems that any ideal observer theory meets attraction (a) by default.
Firth, therefore, concentrates on how his ideal observer theory could meet attraction (b). In order to show that the truth of ethical statements is strictly absolutist, Firth tries to convince us that no two ideal observers would show different psychological reactions to any given situation. In order to guarantee the exact coincidence of any two ideal observers' psychological reactions, Firth presents a very demanding set of defining characteristics that he thinks should be met by any being that can be properly regarded as an 'ideal observer'.
The extremely demanding set of defining characteristics that Firth presents causes a number of problems.
First, even though the set of defining characteristics that Firth presents is extremely (almost ridiculously) demanding, it still cannot guarantee that all ideal observers would show exactly the same psychological reactions towards any given act. This is mainly due to the vagueness that appeal as an empirically viable first-order moral theory to the extent that it cannot provide any answers to specific moral problems by any empirically viable method.
is associated with the notion of 'normality'. What this shows is that Firth cannot help his analysis from becoming some version of a relativist analysis.
Second, it is quite obvious that no actual human beings can even approximately meet the full set of defining characteristics that Firth proposes. Firth acknowledges this fact and tries to block the nonexistence of ideal observer in actuality from influencing the truth-value of ethical statements by interpreting the terms "objectivist" and "subjectivist" in the traditional ontological sense and labeling his ideal observer theory as objectivist. However, Firth is quite unaware that his ideal observer theory, by interpreting the truth of ethical statements to be contingent, can be regarded as a subjectivist analysis even by his own standards.
Third, the fact that no actual human being can even approximately meet the defining characteristics of an ideal observer theory renders the theory completely empirically inaccessible, which is a big problem for a theory that pays so many lip services to making first-order moral statements empirical.
In short, despite Firth's constant effort to make his ideal observer theory work the effort is not successful; more generally, his ideal observer theory fails to preserve two of the main attractions of an ideal observer theory: (b) and (c). 
